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How should one embark upon the task of drafting a uniform or model
act on mediation? One way would be by listing all the key issues with
which such a statute must deal (e.g., confidentiality of mediation
proceedings, liability of mediators, enforcement of agreements to mediate
as well as of agreements arrived at in mediation, etc.) and then arguing
them out one by one and carefully drafting the requisite provisions. Of
course this would involve some reference to existing statutes and the
secondary literature, but this research effort would be primarily a policy-
based one.
Another approach would draw upon the available empirical data and
pattern the statute closely upon those data. For example, if the goal of such
a statute is to facilitate the wide use of mediation, then we would take
careful account of recent research suggesting that actually requiring lawyers
to participate in mediation rather than subjecting them to continuing legal
education courses better accomplishes the objective of widespread use.
This symposium represents a blend of these two approaches. Before
delving into the substantive issues, it is appropriate to take special note of
Jim Brudney's splendid essay on how a mediation statute fits with the
uniform state law experience. Those of us who have not worked before in
that world have a lot to learn, as, for example, the difference between a
model act and a uniform act. Not surprisingly, the National Conference of
Comnmissioners on Uniform State Laws appears to give higher priority to
uniform acts. Some of us who are academics are more drawn to a model act
because it seems to respond better to the present diversity of practice and
even conceptualization of the mediation process. 2 But Jim Brudney tells us
we may be able to have the best of both worlds by opting for a uniform act
covering some of the basic issues (such as privilege) and then adding in an
array of optional provisions on such unsettled and controversial topics as
the qualification of mediators. Pointing out that surprisingly only about one-
fourth of the uniform acts have been adopted by more than forty states, he
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urges us to make our case forcefully and to bring to bear the myriads of
interest groups so as to give this effort a maximal chance of success.
Let me then turn to the substantive issues. I have already referred to the
Rogers and McEwen article on how law can be used to increase the use of
mediation. First they strongly argue for facilitation by the judicial system of
early settlement efforts. They then draw upon empirical research to show
that this goal is most likely achieved by a regime of mandatory mediation
sessions, with appropriate opt-outs and with required attendance by both
principals and attorneys.
Much to their credit, Professors Rogers and McEwen recognize that
some types of provisions arguably belong in any model or uniform
mediation statute even though there is no persuasive evidence that this will
enhance use of the process. Some of the examples they cite are qualification
provisions (which will perhaps increase the cost and hence limit use),
provisions dealing with the enforcement of agreements to mediate and of
agreements arrived at in mediation, and duties by attorneys to apprise
clients of ADR options. All these provisions (except possibly the last one3)
seem important parts of a comprehensive mediation statute.
Two of the other papers add some qualifications to the recommendation
for mandatory mediation. The paper by McEwen and Williams on access to
justice examines a number of threshold barriers (such as the high costs of
mediation including the possible participation of attorneys) and concludes
that there must be a mixture of public funding, pro bono services by paid
mediators and use of volunteers to assure adequate access. Interestingly
they also point out that mandatory mediation may even restrict access to
court where parties don't have the time or money to pursue both processes.
While the just cited recommended alternatives may take care of the lack of
money to pay mediators, they can't cover the extra time needed. So the
authors conclude that there should be an exception to a regime of
mandatory mediation if parties do not have time to pursue both processes.
One is left to wonder about the workability of such a proposal, and, more
fundamentally, whether such a procedure wouldn't conflict with the
legislature's apparent judgment that certain types of cases are better
resolved by mediation and hence must be brought there first.
Levin and Guthrie in their paper on party satisfaction point to the
overwhelming empirical evidence of party satisfaction with the mediation
process, even in cases where the matter was not resolved. They conclude
3 Some states (e.g., Hawaii and Colorado) have inserted such a provision in the
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that such satisfaction can be assured and enhanced if the courts and
mediators provide realistic expectations at the outset, and if the parties can
choose the mediator-a goal not met in many mandatory mediation
programs.
The most challenging paper in this fine set of papers is Josh Stulberg's
essay on mediation fairness-a perennial hard nut. He rightly begins by
pointing out that mediation fairness should not be determined by simply
comparing the result to the likely court outcome. After all, a prime
advantage of mediation is that it can provide more flexible and more
optimal outcomes than a court could.
One must of course distinguish between process fairness and outcome
fairness. Concerning the latter, Professor Stulberg concludes that mediation
must not put the parties in a much worse position than they were in at the
start of the mediation. That seems to this writer a dubious test. If the parties
freely choose a solution that makes at least one of them worse off, but has
the plus of ending the conflict and presumably providing other benefits for
the assenting party, why should that be objectionable? Indeed, given the
subjective nature of outcome fairness, is it possible to come up with any
generally acceptable formula? Isn't the main goal one of process fairness
(i.e., that the agreement was reached freely and knowingly)? Certainly
Stulberg's recommendation that there should be an absolute right to counsel
in all mediation cases would go far towards fulfilling that objective, but
whether this goal is feasible in all types of mediation when society hasn't
even reached that point in most civil litigation remains an open question.
Still, our understanding of the complex parameters of process and outcome
fairness is surely enriched by Stulberg's provocative discussion.
So much for some of the topics that should be covered. There is
disagreement among some of the writers about topics that should not be
covered. Thus Professor Stulberg says mediators should not be allowed to
give their own evaluation; McEwen and Williams, and this writer,
disagree. Quite aside from the advisability of such a ban,4 there is a serious
question whether this kind of standard of practice belongs in a uniform or
model law.
As the discerning reader will note, there is ample and stimulating grist
here for the drafter's mill. Let us hope that the process that will now begin
will be a productive one.
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